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INTRODUCTION
Known for his role as an intellectual property “entrepreneur”1, Mr.
Leo Stoller is the prototypical trademark troll.2 Stoller has made it his
business to sue as many parties as possible for the use of “his”
STEALTH trademark.3 One court recently described Stoller as
*

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; pursuing Certificate in Intellectual Property Law; B.A. Political
Science, June 2005, DePaul University.
1
Colin Moynihan, He Says He Owns The Word ‘Stealth’ (Actually, He Claims
‘Chutzpa’, Too), N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com
/2005/07/04/business/04stealth.html.
2
The trademark troll sets out to register as many marks as possible, without the
intent to use and invest in the mark. Just as the “forest troll” appears to collect his
“toll” from travelers passing over a bridge, the trademark troll magically appears
when an unsuspecting producer adopts the same or similar mark and poses upon
them two choices: pay to get a license to use my mark or litigate.
3
Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Acting as a sort of intellectual property entrepreneur, Stoller has federally
registered scores of trademarks with the U.S. PTO…many containing everyday
words that regularly pop up in commercial enterprise”).

452
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

1

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 14

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

“running an industry that produces often spurious, vexatious, and
harassing federal litigation.”4 The problem with Mr. Stoller is that the
intellectual property community and the courts doubt whether Stoller
actually uses the STEALTH mark on actual goods sold in commerce.5
Rather, he merely exploits his trademark registrations to negotiate and
extract licensing fees from companies using the mark on their own
products.6 Some of those third parties, when threatened with litigation,
have entered into licensing or settlement agreements for use of the
STEALTH mark. These agreements cover a startling collection of
products, ranging from “hand tools to make prosthetic limbs to
construction consulting services to track lighting.”7 It was reported that
Stoller even accused Sony Pictures of infringing the STEALTH mark
by including the word as the title of a film featuring Navy pilots.8
Although Stoller purports to have been hired to serve as a
trademark expert at various trademark trials throughout the country,9
his situation exemplifies a common misunderstanding that exists
among the public, legal practitioners, and even district courts. The
mere federal registration of a mark does not give the trademark owner
a monopoly over that mark; as the Seventh Circuit has noted, “bare
registration is not enough.”10 Under the Lanham Trademark Act, a
4

Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, No. 04 C 3049, 2005 WL 2445898 at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
5
Id. at *2.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Moynihan, supra note 1.
9
Stoller’s website is accessible at: http://rentmark.blogspot.com. On this site
Stoller identifies himself as the “Director and national spokesman” [sic] for the
Americans for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, which “advocates the
strict enforcement of American intellectual property rights”. He also identifies
himself as a “Trademark Expert” and offers the following services: “trademark
valuations, licensing, appeal drafting etc.”
10
Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir.
2007); see also Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1992)
(registration itself only establishes a rebuttable presumption of use as of the filing
date.”); Allard Enter., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146 F.3d 350,
356 (6th Cir. 1998) (“One of the bedrock principles of trademark law is that
trademark or service marks ownership is not acquired by federal or state registration.
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trademark owner must use the mark in commerce to acquire and
maintain ownership rights in that mark.11 This requirement operates to
prevent the “banking” or “warehousing” of marks.12 Warehousing is a
term used to describe the practice of a party that registers trademarks
and effectively collects and stores them as opposed to actually using
them. This type of activity is barred both under the Lanham Act and at
common law. One cannot register a trademark, cease using the mark
on ones’ products and/or services, and then attempt to extract a
licensing fee from sellers of products or services well-suited to adopt
that trademark.13 This type of operation was, and continues to be,
Stoller’s modus operandi.14 Stoller or one of his corporate entities have
been involved in at least 49 cases in the Northern District of Illinois
alone and at least 47 of them purport to involve trademark
infringement.15 Tellingly, no court has ever found infringement of any
trademark allegedly held by Stoller or his related companies in any
reported opinion.16 Although one would think that these staggering
statistics alone would deter Stoller, this apparently has not been the
case. In fact, Stoller’s cases have generally “proven so frivolous and
Rather, ownership rights flow only from prior appropriation and actual use in the
market.”); Boxcar Media, LLC v. Redneckjunk, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.
Mass. 2004) (“Federal registration is irrelevant to a determination of whether a
trademark is granted protection.”).
11
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
12
Custom Vehicles, Inc., 476 F.3d 481 at 485.
13
See id.
14
See Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007)
(stating that this practice formed an “essential part of [Stoler’s] business strategy”
and noting that if “there was a Hall of Fame for Hyperactive trademark litigators,
Stoller would be on it”).
15
Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
16
Id. at *2. The Northern District court alone has ordered Stoller or his
corporate entities to pay defendants' attorneys' fees and costs in at least six other
reported cases: S Indus., Inc. v. Ecolab Inc., 1999 WL 162785, *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16,
1999); S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 1998 WL 157067 (N.D. Ill. Mar.31, 1998); S
Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1998); S
Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 775 (N.D. Ill. 1998); S
Indus., Inc. v. Hobbico, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 210 (N..D. Ill. 1996)
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wasteful of court resources” that in his most recent action, the
Northern District of Illinois enjoined him from filing any new civil
action in the district courts without first obtaining the court’s
permission.17
In Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a decision of the Northern District of Illinois in which the
court utilized two important weapons to counter Stoller’s most recent
meritless trademark infringement suit: the power to order the
cancellation of a trademark registration and the power to award
attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.18 Not only did the
Seventh Circuit approve of the district courts decision to cancel the
plaintiff’s mark, the court stated that “where . . . a registrant’s asserted
rights to a mark are shown to be invalid, cancellation is not merely
appropriate, it is the best course.”19 If the approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit is implemented more often by district courts
throughout the country, trademark trolls such as Stoller may think
twice about bringing suit for infringement of a mark in which no
protectable rights exist.
This Comment proposes that other courts should follow the lead
of the Seventh Circuit and that the cancellation-as-best-course rule
should become the norm rather than the exception.20 A more liberal
invocation of the court’s discretionary power of cancellation promotes
trademark law’s three policy components: protection of producers,
protection of consumers from confusion, and the encouragement of
fair competition. Second, this policy assuages the costs associated with
needless trademark litigation. Third, it places the public on notice of
cancellations as ordered by the courts and provides increased certainty
regarding trademark rights to the public. Finally, this policy also
operates as a judicial “refreshing” mechanism for clearance of the
unused trademark from the trademark register. The combination of
mark cancellation and the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the
prevailing party creates a powerful situation which may deter
17

Central Manufacturing, Inc., 492 F.3d at 881.
Id. at 876.
19
Id. at 883.
20
Id.
18
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trademark trolls, such as Stoller, from filing or threatening to file
meritless suit against innocent parties for use of a mark he lacks valid
ownerships rights.
Section I of this Comment outlines the commercial use
requirement as found in the Lanham Trademark Act (“Lanham Act”)
including its connection to the acquisition of federal registration,
determining priority among competing claimants, and its relevance to
deterring trademark warehousing. This section also discusses the
commercial use requirement’s relationship to the “triumvirate” − the
consumers, producers, and competitors the Lanham Act seeks to
protect. Section II analyzes the consequences of the failure to use a
mark in commerce, particularly in the context of litigation, where nonuse is used to collaterally attack the registration of the plaintiff. Most
importantly, this section discusses the power of the court to order the
cancellation of registrations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1119 of the
Lanham Act. Section III discusses the practical, evidentiary issues of
proof where a plaintiff must prove commercial use to establish
ownership and prevail on an infringement claim. Section IV introduces
the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Central Manufacturing. Section
V discusses the Seventh Circuit’s view of proper invocation of the
power of cancellation and the award of attorneys’ fees in cases
involving trademark trolls and proposes the cancellation-as-bestcourse is a valuable and recommended approach that other circuits
should follow. Finally, Section VI sets forth a separate discussion of
the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in trademark litigation in the
Seventh Circuit and its role in deterring the trademark troll.
I. BACKGROUND: THE LANHAM ACT AND TRADEMARK LAW POLICY
The Lanham Act was created in 1946 and remains the federal
statute governing trademark rights.21 The Act protects both registered
and common law rights and defines the term “trademark” to include
“any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof: (1)
used by a person or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
21

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141(n) (2006).
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in commerce…to identify and distinguish his or her goods… from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.”22 Under this definition, in
order to qualify for protection a mark must be “distinctive.”23 In
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., the Second Circuit
set forth the now well-known categories of marks: (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.24 Generic
marks never merit protection; descriptive marks are only protectable
with proof of secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness;
suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful marks are protectable without
proof of secondary meaning.25 A mark achieves secondary meaning
when, after being introduced to the market, unknown to consumers,
the products catches on and the mark comes to be uniquely associated
with the original source.26
The Abercrombie spectrum indicates a progressive degree of
distinctiveness and therefore a concomitant increase in the strength of
a mark.27 Arbitrary and fanciful marks are on one end and generic
marks on the other. A mark owner is “better off adopting a fanciful or
arbitrary mark” where they have yet to achieve the brand popularity
level of someone like Nike.28 By not adopting a mark that is merely
descriptive, a mark owner need not prove that the mark has acquired
secondary meaning in the minds of the relevant buying public.29 It is
easier to gain protection in the first instance and gives the mark owner
time to develop consumer recognition through promotion and
22

Id. at § 1127.
Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara, Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210-216 (2001) (discussing
distinctiveness in the context of trade dress protection).
24
537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
25
Id. at 9-11.
26
Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 483-484 (7th Cir.
2007); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (“…nothing in this chapter shall prevent the
registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce…”).
27
American Society of Plumbing Engineers v. TMB Pub., Inc., 109 Fed. Appx.
781,789 n.9 (7th Cir. 2004).
28
Custom Vehicles, 476 F.3d 481 at 484 (7th Cir. 2007).
29
Id.
23
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investment. On other hand, refusing protection for generic marks
ensures that typical words are not monopolized.
A. Commercial Use and Acquisition of Trademark Rights
Once a mark has met the statutory definition of a trademark by
obtaining the requisite degree of distinctiveness the mark owner must
meet the second requirement for registration: use in commerce.30 The
distinctiveness and commercial use requirements are closely related:
the more a mark is used in commerce the more likely the mark is to be
viewed as distinctive of the registrant’s goods. The commercial use
requirement is tied to Congress’ ability to regulate trademarks in the
first instance: the power to regulate trademarks arises out of the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.31
There are two methods of registration.32 First, a mark owner who
has already begun use of the mark in commerce may file an
application for registration.33 Second, a person who has yet to use the
mark in commerce, but has a bona fide intent to use the mark in
commerce, may file an intent to use application (“ITU”).34 Where a
person files an ITU application it must be followed up with proof of
actual use of the mark in commerce within six months of the date of
filing.35 Filing an ITU application establishes priority as of the date of

30

15 U.S.C. § 1051.
See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (distinguishing
between Congress’s express power to regulate patent and copyright under Article I,
Section 8 and the power to regulate trademarks as falling only under the Commerce
Clause); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining commerce as “all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated”).
32
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a), 1051(b).
33
Id. at § 1051(a).
34
Id. at § 1051(b) (“(1) A person who has a bona fide intention … to use a
trademark in commerce may request registration … (3) The statement shall …
specify-- (A) that the person making the verification believes that he or she… [is] be
entitled to use the mark in commerce…”).
35
Id. at § 1051(d).
31
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filing (except as against those already using the mark) and thus serves
as a “place-holder.”36
Under the Lanham Act, the term “use in commerce” means the
“bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark.”37 This definition represents an
effort on behalf of Congress to eliminate what was known as the
“token use” of a trademark, or, minor acts or sales made to meet the
threshold commercial use requirement in order to register the mark,
maintain the mark, or to even prevent others from adopting the mark.38
As evidenced by the aforementioned requirements, although
trademark rights are established through use, not by virtue of
registration,39 federal registration remains desirable because it endows
additional benefits not provided at common law including: (1)
nationwide constructive notice of the use and ownership of the mark;
(2) original jurisdiction in federal courts based on federal question
jurisdiction for actions concerning the mark; (3) prima facie evidence
of the validity of the mark; (4) the right to use the mark nationally; (5)
the right to use the mark; (6) the assistance of customs officials in
policing the importation products bearing infringing marks.40
Thus, in litigation, favorable presumptions of validity, ownership,
and the exclusive right to use the mark attach where a registered mark
is at issue.41 The Seventh Circuit has noted, however, that the
evidentiary value of a certificate of registration may be one of minor

36

Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
38
See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1768, 1774 (T.T.A.B
1994); see also The Trademark Law Revision Act, Public Law 100-667 (1988).
39
See In re ECCS, Inc., 94 F.3d 1578, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1996); see also In re Int’l
Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The federal
registration of a trademark does not create an exclusive property right in the mark”).
40
America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2001); see
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1121, 1115, 1072, 1111, and 1125(b).
41
15 U.S.C. § 1115.
37
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significance because the presumption is an easily rebuttable one.42 It
“merely shifts the burden of production to the alleged infringer.”43
B. Commercial Use and Priority Contests
Commercial use is also relevant to establishing priority among
competing claimants of trademark rights. “Priority contests” arise
where two or more parties allege prior use, and thus, valid rights in,
the same trademark for similar products or services.44 The first date of
commercial use serves as a guidepost to determining who has better
rights, or, priority, in the mark. The first party to use a mark is
generally considered the “senior” user and is entitled to enjoin the
“junior” user from using the same, or a confusingly similar, mark.45
The senior user receives priority over the junior user and has the
power to enjoin the junior user from using the mark on the same or
related goods. Further, the scope of protection enjoyed by a trademark
owner is not restricted to the original owner’s use of the mark. The
“natural expansion” doctrine allows that owner to extend the scope of
its protection for products the mark was originally used, but also
related product lines.46 Under this doctrine, the senior trademark
owner’s rights are limited to those goods that have been used and
those related to the original goods, but also those that lie within the
realm of natural expansion.47 Accordingly, commercial use has
repercussions for a trademark owner’s use of the mark when faced
with others using the mark on the same products, but also other
products so long as they are related to the original.
42

Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir.

2007).

43

Id. (citing Door Systems, Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc., 83 F.3d 169,
172 (7th Cir.1996)); see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 2005).
44
See J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 20:17 (4th Ed.)(2007).
45
Id. at § 16:5 (discussing the nature of the senior users market and the “zone
of natural expansion” doctrine).
46
Id.
47
Id.
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C. Commercial Use, Trademark Warehousing, and Policy Implications
The commercial use requirement also prevents mark owners from
warehousing and hoarding trademarks.48 As Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit recently explained in Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest
River:
Bare registration is not enough. Trademarks cannot be
“banked” or “warehoused”- that is, you cannot register
thousands of names, unrelated to any product or service
that you sell, in the hope of extracting a license fee from
sellers of products or services for which one of your names
might be apt.49
When trademarks are warehoused they do not serve the principle
policies that form the very basis for trademark protection: protecting
consumers, protecting trademark owner’s investments in their mark,
and protecting and fostering fair competition.
Trademark law protects consumers from confusion between
brands in the marketplace and also allows consumers to distinguish
between competing products.50 The law functions to prevent confusion
by reserving protection only for marks that are distinctive of the goods
or services of the mark owner. Because others are prohibited from
using the mark on the same or similar goods, consumers are
guaranteed that the products they buy originate with the same source,
48

Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1581
(Fed.Cir.1990) (“The Lanham Act was not intended to provide a warehouse for
unused marks”).
49
Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 219 (4th
Cir. 2002)).
50
See Graham B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism In Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1613 (2007) (“Once
consumer understanding, and hence a trademark right, is established, the primary
goal of trademark law is to protect the integrity of that understanding by minimizing
consumer confusion.”).
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thus preventing consumer confusion. If a mark is not used, the
consuming public cannot make the necessary link between the mark
and a specific product.51 Thus, hoarding prevents other producers from
making rightful use of a mark and inhibits the creation of real
connections between products and their sources.
These connections not only assist consumers in making
purchasing decision by distinguishing among competing brands, but
also function to reduce consumer search costs.52 Trademarks serve as
source-identifiers by furnishing information about a products source,
quality, and other important characteristics in a quick and costless
fashion. This phenomenon is referred to as the reduction of “consumer
search costs.”53 When a consumer makes a connection between a
product or service in terms of price, quality, or the sheer image of lifestyle a consumer wishes to exude54, the trademark becomes something
they can rely on time and again to assist them in making their
purchasing decisions. Thus, consumer “search costs” are reduced due
to the ease by which a consumer chooses a product based upon the
association of the mark with the product and its source.55 Neither of
the aforementioned consumer-related policies of trademark law could
be fulfilled without the commercial use requirement. Mark hoarding
minimizes the communication between the consumer, the mark, and
the producer. Hence, consumers lose meaningful and valuable
information that they may use in making purchasing decisions.
Trademark law also functions to protect trademark producers. The
law protects the trademark owners’ rightful use from appropriation by
others. The law bans pirating use by others who may create and sell
products or market services of sub-standard quality. Protection
promotes and rewards investment by preserving the value of marks by
51

See, e.g. Panavision Int’l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir.

1998).

52

See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 759
(1990) (“Successful marks are like packets of information. They lower consumer
search costs, thus promoting the efficient functioning of the market.”).
53
See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69
J.POL.ECON. 213 (1961).
54
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
55
Id. at 510-511.
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prohibiting others from using the mark. By prohibiting others from
free-loading off of the good-will a mark has established producers and
owners are rewarded for investing time, effort, and money in
producing and developing new brands with corresponding new
products. Thus, producers and owners are rewarded for creation and
use by receiving the protection the law affords them in exchange.
Trademark owners are also rewarded with continued patronage and
brand loyalty, when they have made efficient use of their marks. As
noted above, trademarks reduce consumer search costs, thereby
increasing the ability and perhaps frequency of repeat purchasers. The
use in commerce requirement is a necessary tradeoff for these benefits
to accrue to the mark owner. In theory, if they do not use the marks in
commerce they will not benefit financially from the trademark
registration. Thus, it is always in their best interest to market and
promote their mark as much as possible and to create quality goods
associated with the mark in order to increase sales and brand loyalty.
The commercial use requirement also functions to protect and
promote fair and honest competition between businesses. Commercial
use prevents trademark hoarding, thereby discouraging the artificial
reservation and depletion of the trademark reservoir. In exchange for
protection, mark owners are permitted to appropriate a term. The
trademark rights scenario inherently impairs competition by
“impeding the ability of competitors to indicate that their brands are in
the same product space.”56 By forcing registrants to actually use marks
or lose them trademark law grants producers freedom to pick and
choose terms to accurately describe products and services, unless
someone has already adopted and made valid, fair use of the term
before them. Furthermore, innocent trademark adopters are protected
from trademark trolls threatening license or litigation. Confident that
the law only protects registrants who make valid commercial use of
their mark producers need not heed to such demands.
Accordingly, the commercial use requirement forms the very core
of the fundamental policies trademark law was designed to protect.
56

Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir.

2007).
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Consumers, trademark owners, and competition all directly benefit by
vigilant enforcement of the use in commerce requirement.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO USE MARK IN COMMERCE
The failure to use a mark in commerce may arise in two contexts:
in inter-partes proceedings before the United State Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and when raised as a collateral attack in
litigation. The Lanham Act gives concurrent power to order the
cancellation of a mark to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”) and the courts.57 In either context, the non-use of a mark
may be challenged on grounds of abandonment or a user may allege
use of the mark prior to the date of registration thereby creating a
priority contest.58 A party may file a petition to cancel a trademark
directly with the USPTO subject to certain restrictions as explained
supra in Section B.59 One can also challenge the validity of a mark and
request a court to order its cancellation during trademark litigation.60
A. Commercial Use and Grounds for Cancellation
In some cases, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 of the Lanham Act acts as fiveyear statute of limitations on an opponent’s ability to challenge a
mark.61 Marks that have been registered for less than five years may be
cancelled “for any reason which would have been sufficient to deny
registration in the first instance.”62 This limit applies to claims that
there was no bona fide use of the mark in commerce to support the

57

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1119.
Id. at § 1064 (setting forth grounds for cancellation).
59
Id. at § 1064.
60
Id. at §§ 1119, 1067.
61
Id. at § 1154.
62
Id. at §§ 1064, 1071(b)(1); Int’l. Order of Jobs Daughters v. Lindeburg &
Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at §
20:52.
58
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original registration.63 However, a mark may always be challenged on
the grounds that it has been abandoned regardless of how long a mark
has been registered.64
During the hypothetical priority contest, a party will inevitably
invoke § 1052(d), which states that a trademark may not be registered
if it “consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles” a mark
“previously used in the U.S. by another and not abandoned, as to be
likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant,
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”65 Where a
party realizes that a mark they have been using is the same or
confusingly similar to a mark on the register they may have cause to
file a petition to cancel that mark if the party’s date of first use is
before that of the registrant.66 In this context, the first step to establish
priority is to demonstrate a date of use prior to that of the registrant.67
The second step is proving likelihood of confusion, assessed under the
TTAB’s likelihood of confusion factors, which includes the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods
or services in which the mark is used.68 If these two elements are met,
63

15 U.S.C. § 1064; see also Jonathon Hudis, Beginning An Inter Partes
Proceedings Before The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: Nature, Grounds, and
Initial Pleadings, 890 PLI/Pate 103 at 117 (2007).
64
15 U.S.C. § 1064. Other challenges that are not subject to the five year
statute of limitations includes claims that: (1) the mark has become generic; (2) the
mark is functional; (3) the mark was obtained fraudulently; (4) that the mark
misrepresents its source; (5) that the mark was obtained contrary to the provisions of
§ 1064, which sets forth the standards for registering “collective” and “certification”
marks; or (6) that the mark . . . is comprised of, among other things . . . immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter.
65
Id. at § 1052.
66
See e.g. Ford Motor Co. v. Ford, 462 F.2d 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) (cancelling “Ford Records” registration because of
likelihood of confusion with Ford Motor Company’s trademark “Ford”); Southern
Enters., Inc. v. Burger King of Florida, Inc., 419 F.2d 460 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(cancelling “Whoppaburger” registration because of likelihood of confusion with
Burger King’s “Whopper” trademark”).
67
Hudis, supra note 63, at 120.
68
Id; see also In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (setting forth factors relevant to likelihood of confusion analysis).
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that party will likely be deemed the “senior” user and the registrant the
“junior” user and the junior user’s registered mark should be cancelled
pursuant to § 1052(d).
On the other hand, a more direct consequence of the failure to
make bona fide use of a mark in commerce arises in the context of a
claim of abandonment. Pursuant to § 1127, a trademark has been
abandoned where use has been discontinued with the intent not to
resume.69 Thus, the existence of abandonment is a two prong inquiry:
(1) there must be a period of non-use and (2) the user must also intend
not to resume that use.70 Intent may be inferred from the
circumstances.71 It is also a question of fact.72 Non-use of a trademark
for three consecutive years constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.73 The effect of this prima facie case is to eliminate the
challenger’s burden to establish the element of intent.74 Thus, it shifts
the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to
abandon to the plaintiff or trademark owner.75 A claim of abandonment
may be the basis of a cancellation proceeding in the TTAB or may be
asserted as an affirmative defense to litigation.
B. Cancellation and Inter-Partes Proceedings Before the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office
The TTAB has jurisdiction over four types of inter partes
proceedings: oppositions, cancellations, interferences, and concurrent

69

Id. at § 1127
Id.; see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 17:9.
71
15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also M. L. Cross, Abandonment of a Trademark or
Tradename, 3 A.L.R.2d 1226 (2007) (recognizing that intent is most often presumed
from the circumstances because rarely do mark owners expressly indicate their intent
to abandon a mark); see also FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. CareFirst of Maryland,
Inc. 479 F.3d 825, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“abandonment is a question of fact”).
72
FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc., 479 F.3d 825 at 830.
73
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
74
Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
75
Id. at 1579.
70
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use proceedings.76 Cancellation proceedings may be initiated by any
person who believes that they are or will be damaged by a registered
mark.77 An inter partes proceedings before the TTAB is similar to
district court proceedings in that there are pleadings, motions,
discovery and brief filing.78 They differ, however, because the TTAB is
an administrative tribunal and thus, proceedings are conducted solely
in writing.79 A party to a proceedings may never even come before the
board, by way of giving witness testimony or otherwise, unless a party
requests oral hearing on the matter.80
Although the failure to petition for cancellation over a long period
of time will not preclude a party from raising cancellation as a defense
to an infringement suit brought by the registrant81, that failure may
“smack tactical afterthoughts” to a court in later proceedings.82 Thus,
where one doubts the validity of a registration it is always the better
course to petition to cancel the mark rather than adopting a “wait and
see” approach.83 Although hindsight is twenty-twenty, there are major
benefits to filing a petition to cancel, aside from the obvious proactive
avoidance of being placed in the defending position in litigation. First,
an inter partes proceeding is doubtlessly less costly than the assertion
of either priority or abandonment as an affirmative defense in
litigation. Second, an inter partes proceeding is a less time-consuming
endeavor. Although it is arguable that the TTAB is just as backlogged

76

See Hudis, supra note 63, at 111; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063, 1064, 1092.
A person may oppose the registration of a mark shown in pending
application pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1063 and may also petition for cancellation of a
mark post-registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
78
See Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (hereinafter
“TBMP”), Chapter 102.02, 2d Ed., 1st Rev. (March 12, 2004) accessible at:
http://www.uspto.gov/go/dcom/ttab (USPTO rules governing the procedures are
designed to approximate the proceedings in a courtroom trial)).
79
Id. at Chapter 102.02.
80
Id.
81
Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 6 n.5 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
82
See McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 30:109.
83
Id.
77
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as the district courts, the average time is much less than that of
litigation.
Further, where a party receives an adverse decision from the
TTAB, that party is entitled to appeal. A party may appeal a decision
of the TTAB to either the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
or to a federal district court.84 In an appeal to the Federal Circuit, the
case proceeds on the closed administrative record and no new
evidence is permitted.85 In contrast, an appeal to the district court is
both an appeal and a new action, which allows the parties to request
additional relief and to submit new evidence.86 The courts of appeals,
other than the Federal Circuit, have appellate jurisdiction to review the
district court's decision.87
C. Cancellation and Litigation
The power to cancel a trademark is not limited to the USPTO. As
Judge Easterbrook has noted, “trademark law does not reserve the
cancellation power to the PTO. A court may cancel a mark itself or
order the agency to do so.”88 The power to order the cancellation of a
mark is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1119.89 That section provides: “In
any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the
right to registration, order the cancellation of registrations, in whole or
in part, restore cancelled registrations, and otherwise rectify the
register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action.”90
The “net effect” of 15 U.S.C § 1119 is to give the courts “concurrent

84

15 U.S.C § 1071; see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc. 267 F.3d
660, 673 (7th Cir. 2001); see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at §§ 21:20, 21:25,
21:26.
85
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4); see also CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 660.
86
CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 660 (citing Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975
F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1992)); see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 21:20.
87
15 U.S.C. § 1121(a).
88
Ruth Foundation v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir.
2002).
89
15 U.S.C. § 1119; see also Ruth Foundation, 297 F.3d at 665.
90
Ruth Foundation, 297 F.3d at 665.
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power” with the USPTO to conduct cancellation proceedings.91 The
Supreme Court has noted that § 1119 grants the court “broad power”
to order the cancellation of a registered mark."92
Unlike inter partes procedures before the TTAB, cancellation of a
trademark cannot be the only basis of a plaintiff’s suit.93 The Seventh
Circuit has held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear a
claim for cancellation brought by a plaintiff without a current
registration.94 The reasoning for this stems from the language of the
Lanham Act and policy implications. First, the plain language of 15
U.S.C. § 1119 states that the court may order cancellation “in any
action involving a registered mark” and 15 U.S.C. § 1121 grants
jurisdiction to the federal courts “of all actions arising under this
Act.”95 Thus, where a registered mark is not involved a plaintiff may
not invoke the jurisdictional grants of the Lanham Act.96 Second, “if
one could file suit in federal court solely for cancellation of a
registration, this would undercut and short-circuit the power of the
[TTAB].”97 Thus, some other ground for jurisdiction must exist to
invoke the federal jurisdiction of the federal courts, but, theoretically,
diversity alone would suffice.98

91

15 U.S.C. § 1119; see also McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 30:109.
Park’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 213 (1985).
93
See Jasin R. Berne, Court Intervention But Not In Classic Form: A Survey of
Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1157, 1167 (1999).
94
Homemakers, Inc. v. Chicago Home for Friendless, 313 F.Supp 1087, 1087
(N.D. Ill 1970), aff’d, 169 U.S.P.Q. 262 (7th Cir. 1971).
95
15 U.S.C. § 1121; see also id. at § 1338(a).
96
See McCarthy, supra note 44, at § 30:110.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d
485,486 (3d Cir. 1958) (diversity jurisdiction); but see Sam S. Goldstein Industries,
Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
92
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III. CENTRAL MANUFACTURING, INC. V. BRETT: CANCELLATION OF THE
STEALTH MARK AND THE “EXCEPTIONAL” CASE
On April 29, 2004, Stealth Industries, later amended to include
Central Manufacturing, Inc. and Leo Stoller99, filed suit against George
Brett and Brett Brothers Sports International, Inc., seeking an
injunction and damages for the defendant’s improper use of the
“STEALTH” mark on baseball bats in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.100
In response, the defendants asserted thirteen affirmative defenses,
three of which are relevant to this comment: (1) unenforceability due
to invalid or void registrations; (2) abandonment due to failure to use
the mark in connection with the plaintiff’s business; and (3) noninfringement due to the defendant’s use of the mark prior to the
plaintiff’s.101 In filing their motion for summary judgment, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
producing evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact
for trial for three reasons. First, the plaintiff could not show actual use
of the mark on goods sold to the public before the defendant’s first use
of the mark, despite the existence of a federal registration.102 Second,
even if the registration was valid in the first instance, the plaintiff’s
lack of commercial use constituted an abandonment of the mark.103
Third, there could be no likelihood of confusion between the parties
use of the marks because confusion cannot arise in the absence of
use.104 Finally, the defendant asked the court to order the cancellation
99

See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D. Ill., Sep. 2, 2004) (Stoller is the President and
sole shareholder of STEALTH Industries, Inc. and Central Mfg. Co.).
100
Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
101
See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D. Ill., Sep. 2, 2004).
102
Id.
103
Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
104
See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D.
Ill., Sep. 2, 2004). The Seventh Circuit’s likelihood of confusion analysis involves
the application of the following factors: (1) the similarity of the marks in appearance
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of the plaintiff’s ‘249 registration of the STEALTH mark.105 The
defendant did not mention 15 U.S.C. § 1119, which is the section of
the Lanham Act that actually gives the court concurrent authority with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to order the
cancellation of the mark.106 Instead, the defendant argued that the ’249
registration should be cancelled pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d),
which merely recites the grounds for ordering the cancellation of the
mark.107 However, this distinction is one without much significance.
The court still invoked its authority pursuant to that section. After
analyzing each of the defendant’s arguments in turn, on September 30,
2005, Judge Coar of the Northern District of Illinois granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and ordered the
cancellation of the plaintiff’s ‘249 registration.108
First, the court addressed the validity of the plaintiff’s trademark,
setting forth the two requirements that a plaintiff must demonstrate in
order to prove up a claim of trademark infringement: (1) ownership of
a valid trademark and (2) the infringement of that mark.109 In assessing
the validity of the plaintiffs’ trademark, the court held that despite the
presumption of validity that a trademark registration provides, the
plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of use of the mark in

and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area and manner of
concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be used by consumers; (5) the
strength of the plaintiff's mark; (6) whether any actual confusion exists; and (7) the
defendant's intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiffs. See Helene Curtis
Industries, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc, 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977).
105
See Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, 2004 WL 2817117 (N.D.
Ill., Sep. 2, 2004)(The defendant’s invoked 15 U.S.C.§§ 1064 and 1068, which
provide that a mark may be cancelled if it would cause confusion with a previously
existing mark, stating, “[b]ecause it is undisputed that Brett Bros, use of ‘Stealth’ for
baseball bats pre-dates Stoller's alleged use and the goods contained in Stoller's ′249
registration (‘baseball, softball and t-ball bats,’) are similar to Brett Bros’ “Stealth”
mark, there is clearly a likelihood of confusion between the marks”).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at *1.
109
Id. at *5.
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commerce.110 Thus, the plaintiffs could not, and did not, own the mark
“STEALTH” for baseballs or baseball bats.111
A. The Priority Contest: Evidentiary Proof of Commercial Use
Central Manufacturing was a classic priority contest. The
defendants first began using the STEALTH mark on baseball bats and
sold them in commerce in 1999.112 The defendant’s STEALTH
baseball bat has been recognized by the Little League Baseball
Association and the Major League Baseball Association.113 To this day,
the defendant continues to sell its STEALTH bats online and at various
retail outlets.114
The plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that his first use of the
STEALTH mark on baseball related products was in at least 1982.115
As noted above, although the plaintiff claimed to be either the
registrant or assignee of “33 federally registered STEALTH or
STEALTH formative marks,” only two were conceivably relevant to
this suit.116 This is due to the likelihood of confusion requirement: only
the use of a mark that is likely to cause consumer confusion is
actionable.117 Thus, the plaintiff invoked two registrations for products
related to baseball rather than invoking the STEALTH registrations on
wholly unrelated products. The first registration occurred on August
29, 1984 when the plaintiff registered the STEALTH mark for
“sporting goods, specifically, tennis rackets, golf clubs, tennis balls,
basketballs, soccer balls, golf balls, cross bows, tennis racket strings

110

Id.
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at *2.
114
See Brett Brothers Home Page, http://www.brettbats.com (last visited Jan. 3,
2008).
115
Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898, *1, 3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
116
Id. at *2.
117
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
111
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and shuttle cocks” (the “‘378 Registration”).118 On February 9, 2002,
the plaintiff registered the STEALTH mark for “baseball, softball, Tball bats,” (“the ‘249 Registration”).119 The ‘249 Registration’s first
use date of the STEALTH mark for baseball bats was January 3,
2001.120
The court noted that it was undisputed that the plaintiff acquired a
registration for the use of the word “STEALTH” with respect to
baseballs in 1984 (the ‘378 Registration), but equally clear was the
fact that the plaintiffs did not acquire a registration for the use of the
STEALTH mark in relation to baseball bats until 2004 (the ‘249
Registration).121 Thus, if adequate proof existed for the continuous
commercial use of the STEALTH mark on baseball related products
from the date of the first registration, the plaintiff would have priority
over the defendant’s use of the mark.122 However, the plaintiffs “failed
completely to support their claim that they actually used the
STEALTH mark in connection with an established, presently existing,
and ongoing business prior to [defendant’s] use of the word STEALTH
on baseball bats in 1999.”123 The court found it incredulous that the
plaintiff, who claimed to have used the mark for more than a decade,
could not provide a sole invoice indicating any commercial transaction
involving the sale of any baseball-related product under the STEALTH
mark.124 The defendant, however, easily demonstrated that they began
selling baseball bats on their website in 1999 – nearly five years before
118

See United States Trademark Registration No. 1,332,378 (filed August 29,
1984) (cancelled June 26, 2007).
119
See United States Trademark Registration No. 2,892,249 (filed February 1,
2007) (cancelled June 26, 2007).
120
Id.
121
Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 3 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
122
This would only be the case if the court found that the use of the STEALTH
marks on baseball bats was confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s use of the
STEALTH marks on baseballs. This argument was only made in the alternative by
the parties at the district court level because they simply attacked the validity of the
plaintiffs claim to the trademark in the first place under grounds of priority and
abandonment.
123
Central Manufacturing, Inc., 2005 WL 2445898 at *5.
124
Id.
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the 249’ Registration.125 Accordingly, the court found that the
defendant could not infringe because they were the “senior” users to
the mark.126 Thus, the defendants were the parties with valid ownership
rights in the STEALTH mark for baseball bats by virtue of their prior
use.127
Central Manufacturing illustrates that the type and amount of
evidence of commercial use can prove problematic for some plaintiffs.
Stoller’s complete and utter lack of proof of commercial use represents
the extreme case. But, what sort of evidence is sufficient to prove
commercial use? What must a plaintiff show to demonstrate sufficient
use in commerce to prove ownership of a valid and enforceable mark?
If there were a commercial use spectrum, Central Manufacturing
would be at the bottom of the evidentiary standard of proof. In
characterizing the plaintiff’s proof as “unsupported assertions” and
“unauthenticated evidence of small amounts of sales,” the court held
the plaintiff failed to prove ownership rights to the STEALTH mark.128
The most obvious problem was the lack of invoices and receipts
characteristic of actual business transactions between the plaintiff and
consumers or businesses.129 However, to support his claim of
ownership the plaintiff attempted to admit the following documentary
evidence: advertising material and charts of “sales” activity.130 The
court rejected this evidence as unsubstantiated, unbelievable or both.
First, in rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to introduce a sporting
goods magazine to prove “alleged licensee was active in the baseball
market,” the court stated the law was clear that “mere advertising and
documentary use of a notion apart from the goods do not constitute
technical trademark use.131 Plaintiff also attempted to introduce an
advertising flyer for a STEALTH baseball.132 Both were rejected
125

Id. at *13-15.
Id. at *15.
127
Id.
128
Id. at *5.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. (quoting Powermatics, Inc. v. Globe Roofing Prods. Co., 341 F.2d 127,
130 (C.C.P.A. 1965)).
132
Id.
126
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because mere “marketing and promotional materials” alone are
insufficient to constitute trademark use, particularly in the absence of
evidence that the flyer was ever sent out to a potential customer nor
resulted in a single sale of the bat.133
Second, the plaintiff attempted to introduce “Sale Quote Sheets”
and “Stealth Brand Baseball Sales”, but could not explain where the
lump sum yearly numbers came from or to whom or where the alleged
sales were made.134 The court stated that there was simply nothing in
record to indicate that the “sales sheet[s] bear any relation to reality
and is not simply something Plaintiffs generated on a home computer
for the purposes of this litigation.”135 Further, there was no evidence
that the “products ever existed except as lines on a piece of
promotional paper or that any of these corporations ordered even one
item from Plaintiffs.”136 The sales sheets also failed to overcome the
mere advertising hurdle.137 Although the plaintiff testified at his
deposition that he had sold baseball bats, the court refused to give
credence to his self-serving deposition testimony.138
The court did note that “registration, coupled with slight sales,
establishes an exclusive right in the mark against junior users”, but
here, there was absolutely no credible evidence of baseball related
product sales to establish their exclusive right in the STEALTH mark
for baseballs, much less for baseball bats.139
So, what type of evidence is sufficient to establish commercial use
for the purposes of ownership? The Seventh Circuit has stated that this
determination is made on a case by case basis and upon consideration
of the “totality of the circumstances.”140 Although the Ninth Circuit
133

Id.
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at *3.
139
Id. at *5.
140
See, e.g., Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427,
433 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The determination of whether a party has established
protectable rights in a trademark is made on a case by case basis, considering the
totality of the circumstances”).
134
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has held that commercial use sufficient to establish ownership rights
may be proven without evidence of a sale, the Seventh Circuit has not
been so generous.141
In Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., the Seventh Circuit found
evidence of a few sales of products to which the mark had been
affixed insufficient to establish trademark ownership.142 In that case,
the plaintiff hair salon had sold a few bottles of shampoo bearing the
mark over the counter and via mail.143 The court found such limited
sales “neither link the [mark] with [the plaintiff’s] product in the
minds of consumers nor put other producers on notice.”144
Just before Central Manufacturing was decided in 2007, the
Seventh Circuit was presented with the opportunity to pass on another
trademark case relating to the commercial use requirement. In Custom
Vehicles, the court affirmed the decision of the Northern District of
Indiana, dismissing a trademark infringement complaint of the alleged
owner of the mark “Work-N-Play.”145 The court found that the mark
was descriptive when used for a van that could be converted from an
office to a camper, but more importantly, the court held that the sale of
one van without using the trademark was insufficient to place the mark
in use in commerce for the purposes of the Lanham Act.146 The
plaintiffs had filed an intent-to-use application for the mark, however,
that same year a much larger company started using the same mark in
similar types of vans.147 The sales of the second company totaled more
than $10 million whereas the plaintiff had made only one sale of its
van and not even under the Work-N-Play mark.148 Judge Posner,
writing for the court, first noted that even if the mark had been used in
141

Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1195-1196
(existence of sales or lack thereof does not by itself determine whether a user of a
mark has established ownership rights therein).
142
979 F.2d at 503-04.
143
Id. at 503.
144
Id.
145
Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 482 (7th Cir.
2007).
146
Id. at 485.
147
Id.
148
Id.
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the sale, it would not have been enough to place the trademark in the
“ordinary course of trade.”149 The court then went on to state: “[w]e
suppose that one sale of a $150 million airplane or yacht within the
first six months might be sufficient use, for it would be enough to
seize the attention of the relevant market.”150
The court went on to acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has held
that “where a mark has been placed on goods, a single sale or
shipment may be sufficient to support an application to register the
mark” so long as that use is bona fide,” but the court declined to
follow its reasoning.151 The court did note an exception for the
“superexpensive prototype,” such as the yacht example noted above,
where one sale may be sufficient to demonstrate commercial use, but
“not one sale of a van.”152 This singular sale would be too “obscure an
event to alert any significant number of consumers” as to the marks
existence.153
Thus, in assessing the commercial use requirement, the focus is
on whether the mark was adopted and used in a manner sufficiently
public to identify and distinguish the goods to likely consumers of
those particular goods. De minimis use is not sufficient to meet this
standard.154 Hence, slight sales of a product affixed with the mark will
likely not meet the commercial use requirement. Accordingly, in the
district courts governed by the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must be
prepared to present actual and substantiated evidence of sales of the
specific goods affixed with the mark in question before even
contemplating filing suit for trademark infringement.
The defendant’s alternative argument for a claim to priority was
that the plaintiff abandoned the STEALTH mark.155 Although the
149

Id. (citing Lucent Information Management, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies,
Inc., 186 F.3d 315-317 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
150
Id.
151
Id. at 485-486 (discussing Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151,
1157 (9th Cir. 2001)).
152
Id. at 485.
153
Id.
154
See McCarthy, supra note 44, at §16:6.
155
Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 5 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
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district court already determined that the defendant was in fact the
senior user, the court nevertheless engaged in an abandonment
analysis, holding that the plaintiff’s complete inability to produce
evidence of commercial use supported a finding of abandonment.156
B. The District Court’s Ruling
Finally, despite finding that the plaintiff failed its burden of
proving the first prong of the trademark analysis, ownership of a valid
mark, the court continued to apply the seven-factor likelihood of
confusion test.157 Stoller argued that the ‘378 registration, although did
not include baseball bats, was sufficiently strong and related to
baseball bats to cause likelihood of confusion.158 The district court,
however, found that the application of the likelihood of confusion test
weighed overwhelmingly in the defendants favor.159
After assessing the parties’ respective arguments, the district court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.160 In granting
the defendant’s motion, the court also took two steps seemingly
outside of the norm of trademark litigation: the court ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs and ordered
the cancellation of the plaintiff’s 249’ registration.161
First, by invoking the court’s power to order the cancellation of a
mark pursuant to 15 U.S.C § 1119, the court went beyond what was
absolutely required in order for justice to be served in this case. The
defendant’s argued that because they were the senior users of the
STEALTH mark, the plaintiff’s continued registration of the
STEALTH mark for the same goods, baseball bats, violated 15 U.S.C.
1052(d).162 This section states that a mark may be cancelled if it
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles ... a mark or
156

Id. at *6.
Id. at *9-13.
158
Id. at *10.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at *14.
157
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trade name previously used in the United States by another and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.”163 Because the defendant’s were the first to use the
STEALTH mark and the ‘249 Registration claimed baseball bats, the
same goods the defendant’s sold using the mark, sufficiently
likelihood of confusion justified cancellation of the ‘249
registration.164 Accordingly, the district court ordered the cancellation
of the ‘249 registration.165 Second, the award of attorney’s fees under
the Lanham Act is reserved only for those “exceptional” cases; thus, it
is unlikely that a court will award attorneys fees in trademark
litigation. A discussion of the award of attorneys’ fees and costs is
discussed in Section VI infra.
The plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit, challenging the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
the cancellation of the plaintiff’s registration, and the award of
attorney’s fees in costs.166
V. CANCELLATION AS “BEST COURSE” AND THE “STINKING DEAD FISH”
STANDARD FOR REVIEWING ATTORNEYS FEES: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
APPROACH
In affirming the district court’s decision regarding the plaintiff’s
failure to prove valid commercial use of the mark, the Judge Evans,
writing for the court, extensively quoted the district court’s analysis
and rejection of the plaintiff’s evidence, or lack thereof, showing
commercial use of the mark.167 In addressing the district court’s
decision to cancel the plaintiff’s ‘249 registration, the court stated that
“where… a registrant’s asserted rights to a mark are shown to be

163

15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1,14 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
165
Id. at *10.
166
Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
167
Id. at 882-883.
164
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invalid, cancellation is not merely appropriate, it is the best course.”168
Finally, in upholding the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and
costs the court eloquently noted that the court would “not reverse a
determination [to award attorney’s fees and costs] for clear error
unless it strikes us as wrong with the force of a 5-week-old,
unrefrigerated, dead fish.”169 In applying this “olfactory standard” the
court found that the only thing that stunk was the defendant’s actions
in filing suit.170
The issue of trademark cancellation arose by virtue of the
defendant’s collateral attack on the validity of the STEALTH mark.171
The defendants recognized the existence of two important facts in
responding to the plaintiff’s complaint: they were truly the senior users
of the STEALTH mark as used on baseball bats and the lack of
evidence of commercial use also constituted an abandonment of the
STEALTH mark.172 A district court is not required to order the
cancellation of a mark where, as in Central Manufacturing, the mark
is invalid. However, a court need not even wait for a party to request
cancellation: cancellation is a purely optional and discretionary
affirmative step taken on behalf of the court, either prompted by the
alleged infringer’s response to the complaint or on the court’s own
accord. Thus, when the validity of a mark is put in issue173, a court is
faced with a to-cancel or not-to-cancel dilemma. The power to order
the cancellation of a mark is an option often overlooked by many
district courts. But, where a registrant-plaintiff clearly lacks rights to a
mark, through the failure to commercially use the mark or otherwise,
courts should be much more willing to invoke the power of

168

Id. at 883.
Id.
170
See Rodriguez v. Anderson, 973 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing
this standard of review as an “olfactory” one).
171
Central Manufacturing Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 14 -15 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
172
Id.
173
Id. at *14 (“The court may cancel a trademark in an action where the mark’s
validity is placed in issue”).
169
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cancellation, as the Seventh Circuit advocated in Central
Manufacturing.174
The Seventh Circuit not only approved of the district court’s
invocation of its Section 1119 powers in cancelling the plaintiffs mark
but also characterized the action as “not merely appropriate” but “the
best course.”175 Accordingly, more courts should invoke their power to
cancel in trademark litigation where it is obvious that the plaintiff’s
trademark rights are invalid. This approach is supported not only by
the statutory mandate of commercial use and Section 1119’s explicit
grant of the power to cancel to the court, but also many important
policy considerations. In Central Manufacturing the court itself noted
two policies justifying this approach in its opinion. First, the court
characterized the invocation of Section 1119 as putting “the public on
notice of its trademark-related judgments.”176 Second, the court stated
that Section 1119 “arms the court with the power to update the federal
trademark register to account for a mark’s actual legal status (or lack
thereof) after it has been adjudicated, thereby reducing the potential
for future uncertainty over the rights in a particular mark.”177 Below,
these policy implications are assessed. Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s
unique characterization of its standard of review for attorney’s fees in
Lanham cases warrants separate attention.178
A. Certainty, Public Notice, and “Refreshing” Function
The court first noted that a positive effect of the invocation of the
power to cancel serves to “put the public on notice of its trademarkrelated judgments.”179 Once there has been a final judgment either
ordering or affirming an order to cancel and the proper procedures are
followed, that mark is still present on the register, but its status is
“cancelled.” Hence, when the court orders cancellation of a mark that
174

Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
175
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has been abandoned due to non-use or has been invalided on the basis
of priority, the court fulfills the goal of “rectifying the register” as set
forth in Section 1119. This rectification is similar to hitting the refresh
button on an internet webpage: once pressed the old data is discarded
and only new data remains. Thus, the invocation of Section 1119
cancellation serves an important gap-filling function: the USPTO has
neither the resources nor the ability to police every mark on the
register to assure that they are being used in commerce. The liberal use
of Section 1119 serves as a judicial cleansing mechanism to produce a
more updated and coherent register of marks that are actually used,
thereby producing a more accurate picture for those searching for
conflicts in their quest to adopt their own mark. Thus, judicial
refreshment via Section 1119 puts the public on notice of trademark
related judgments.
The court also posited that this refreshment mechanism also
“reduces the potential for future uncertainly over the rights in a
particular mark.”180 Cancellation results in the release of marks back
into the marketplace for others to adopt and invest in. This also
encourages healthy competition. Where the public is on notice of what
marks or terms are monopolized for the purposes of adoption for
specific goods or services, that public is on notice of what marks it can
or cannot appropriate in the course of their own trademark
development and adoption. The more often the register is refreshed,
the more accurate picture trademark-seekers may have to assess
trademark conflicts. Thus, new producers and hopeful mark owners
may adopt words with ease and with confidence.
B. Reduction of Trademark “Thickets”
In addition to providing greater certainty by putting the public on
notice of a marks status, ordering the cancellation of marks reduces
trademark “thickets.” In Custom Vehicles, Judge Posner used the term
“thicket” to describe a situation that would develop where, as here,
trademark owners failed to use (or made commercially insignificant
180

Id.
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use of) a registered mark.181 Trademark thickets “make it difficult for
new producers to find suitable names for their products that had not
already been appropriated to no worthier end than providing the
premise for an infringement suit.”182 Further, “by insisting that firms
use marks to obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs
from reserving brand names in order to make their rivals’ marketing
more costly.”183 Thus, proper cancellation hinders the development of
trademark thickets, thereby ensuring that words or marks are not
depleted from the public arena and businesses are free to use and adopt
them as their own. Unless a trademark registrant actually makes use of
its mark in commerce, the seller should not be allowed to appropriate
the mark, “denying its use to sellers who can actually sell.”184
C. Deterring Trademark Troll and Long-Term Savings
The liberal use of the power to cancel deters acts of trademark
“trolls,” such as Stoller, who have failed to make legitimate use of
their marks. This in turn results in long-term savings. Cancellation cuts
off the presumptions associated with registration and thus may result
in fewer cases filed by trademark trolls. The fewer frivolous trademark
infringement suits that are filed, the fewer judicial recourses and time
that are wasted. In Central Manufacturing, and every other case in
which Leo Stoller had filed suit, the end result was the same: dismissal
or a grant of summary judgment.
In addition to deterring trademark trolls from filing suit,
cancellation protects producers from the threat of suit and/or licensing
demands for the use of a trademark that is no longer valid. In Central
Manufacturing, for example, the plaintiff had “repeatedly sought ways
to get around the law’s prohibition of stockpiling of unused marks, and
this case is no different.”185 By cancelling the plaintiffs mark, the party
181

Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir.

2007).

182

Id. at 485.
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992).
184
Custom Vehicles, Inc., 476 F.3d at 486.
185
Id.
183
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loses a valuable instrument in negotiation: the party no longer has a
conceptually concrete basis for threatening to file suit. Where a
registration is at issue, parties are much more likely to take the threat
seriously than if only common law rights are asserted. Thus, the
trademark troll loses an important bargaining chip when attempting to
extort licensing fees from unsuspecting, innocent users of marks: the
ability to claim ownership rights to, and presumptions associated with,
registration of a trademark.
D. Critiques
The assumptions of long-term savings and deterrence as the result
of cancellation is flawed for one important reason: because registration
merely confers a presumption of the right to use, ownership, and
validity, the loss of the registration results in only the loss of a
registered right. Because trademark rights arise out of use and not
registration, a party may still claim ownership of a valid mark at
common law.186 Thus, a party like Stoller, who despite never winning
one case and being forced to pay for all the costs of litigation in some,
are keen on still filing suit may simply continue to do so. Although the
presumptions of validity are not present, one can still claim rights to a
mark based on mere use pursuant to common law and state claims of
unfair competition. The Lanham Act still provides protection for
unregistered marks. As such, the cancellation of a mark does not bar
an ambitious trademark troll from bringing suit or threatening to file
suit if a licensing agreement is not reached between the parties. Thus,
deterrence and resulting long-term savings may be positive thinking
rather than a realistic result of proactive cancellation by the courts.
However, as discussed below, the threat of not only paying one’s own
costs of litigation, but also the other party’s, may provide an even
greater push to stop trademark trolls from filing suit for infringement
of a mark they do not have rights in.
186

See Posting of John L. Welsh to http://www.thettablog.blogspot.com,
“TTABlog Says: It’s Time to Tackle the ‘Trademark Trolls,’” January 28, 2006
(urging trademark practitioners to demand that the USPTO and TTAB “crack down”
on trademark trolls).
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VI. AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS: LACK OF EVIDENCE OF
COMMERCIAL USE
Where mark cancellation and an award of attorney’s fees and
costs to the defendant are combined, it provides powerful incentives to
only bring suit where a party has confidence in the right to use that
mark. The Seventh Circuit also has a highly unique way of
characterizing the standard under which it reviews a district court’s
award of attorney fees. In reviewing the award in Central
Manufacturing, the court stated, “[w]e will not reverse a determination
for clear error unless it strikes us as wrong with the force of a 5-weekold, unrefrigerated, dead fish.”187 In applying this “olfactory standard”
the court found that the only thing that stunk was the defendant’s
actions in filing suit.188
Aside from this notable characterization of the standard of review
for attorney’s fees, the Seventh Circuit’s review of attorney’s fees
under the Lanham Act has had a colorful progression.189 While an
award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party is the exception and not
the rule, the Seventh Circuit has broadened the scope of “exceptional”
cases to include not just pre-litigation, but also litigation, conduct.190
187

Id.
See Rodriguez v. Anderson, 973 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing
this standard of review as an olfactory one). The “dead fish” standard apparently
originated with Jude Bauer in Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866
F.2d 228, 233 (7thCir.1988), an antitrust case and was also used by Judge Evans in
an earlier trademark infringement case, S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000 Inc., 249
F.3d 625, 627 (7thCir. 2001), also involving the Stoller. It seems as though Judge
Evans reinvented this language and applied it to the trademark contest due to the
nature of the Stoller’s actions.
189
See generally Anne M. Mellen, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under The
Lanham Act: Egregious Litigation Conduct In The Exceptional Case, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1111, 1115 (2004).
190
Id. at 1117 (arguing that “no court has gone as far as the Seventh Circuit,
which shifted attorneys fees for egregious litigation conduct other than of the filing
of vexatious or harassing lawsuits” in discussion of TE-TA-MA Truth FoundationFamily of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662 (7thCir. 2002)).
188
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Generally, the award of attorney’s fees and litigation costs is an
atypical occurrence in trademark litigation.191 There are five possible
bases for awarding attorney fees under federal law.192 First, the
Lanham Act provides for the award of attorneys to the prevailing party
for “exceptional cases.”193 Congress added this section in order to
address the issue of intentional counterfeiting, which makes an award
“virtually mandatory” in such cases.194 Courts may also authorize
attorney fees under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 where an
appeal is “frivolous”195 and likewise under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 in the form of sanctions.196 Of course, all federal courts
have the power to award attorneys fees in cases of bad-faith litigation
practices.197 These awards are available to the prevailing party, whether
that is the prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant.198
191

See id. at 1115.
Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Jordan S. Weinstein, The Fifty-Eighth Year of
Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 6, 191 192 (2006) (“It is possible in some jurisdictions for prevailing parties to secure
awards of attorneys' fees under state law. Nevertheless, most cases to have addressed
the subject have done so under federal law, which generally recognizes five bases for
fee awards.”).
193
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). This 1967 Amendment to the Lanham Act has
been commonly regarded as a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing, Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) which
held that federal courts did not possess the power to grant attorney fee awards under
the Lanham Act. See also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 191 - 192 (2006)
194
See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
1939 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing between awards under Section 35(a) and
Section 25(b) of the Lanham Act; see also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at
191-192 (noting that award of attorney’s fees is required by court in cases of
intentional counterfeiting “unless the court finds extenuating circumstances”).
195
Fed. R. App. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and
reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee.”); see also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 191-192 (2006).
196
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also Davis & Weinstein, supra note 192, at 191 -192
(2006).
197
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991).
198
Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898 *1, 13 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1117(a).
192
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As the district court in Central Manufacturing also explained,
there exists a sixth basis to award attorney’s fees and costs in
trademark litigation where the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practice Act (“ICA”) is invoked.199 Stoller alleged a violation
of the ICA in addition to his Lanham Act claims.200 This is the Illinois
state equivalent to a trademark statute and essentially traces Section
1114 of the Lanham Act. A person is engaged in a deceptive trade
practice if “during the course of his or her business: … (2) causes
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services … [or] (3)
causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association with or certification by another.”201
These claims were resolved against him for the same reasons his
Lanham Act claims were rejected: he failed to prove that he had a
protectable mark and the defendant’s use was not likely to cause
confusion.202 The district court only identified two sources of law
authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees: the Lanham Act and the ICA.
Under both, the court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing parties.203 As noted above, to qualify under the Lanham Act,
the case must be “exceptional.”204 Under the ICA standard, a prevailing
defendant must show that the plaintiff’s suit was “oppressive.”205 The
Seventh Circuit has held that, “a suit can be oppressive because of a
lack of merit and cost of defending though the plaintiff honestly
though mistakenly believes that he has a good case and is not trying
merely to extract a settlement based on the suit's nuisance value.”206
This standard is “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful
199

Central Manufacturing, Inc., 2005 WL 2445898 at *13, citing Illinois
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510/1 (West 2007).
200
Central Manufacturing Inc., 2005 WL 2445898 at *13.
201
815 ILCS 510/2.
202
Id.
203
Id; see also15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see also 815 ILCS 510/10a(c).
204
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
205
Central Manufacturing Inc v. Brett, 2005 WL 2445898, *1, 13 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2005) aff’d, 492 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
206
Id.
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conduct.”207 The district court found this standard unquestionably met
in this case: not only did Stoller offer useless, contradictory, and
“seemingly fantastical” documents and uncorroborated “arguably
false” testimony, but brought suit before he had even obtained the ‘249
registration.208 Having found that Stoller’s actions met the
“oppressive” standard under the ICA, the court also held that this case
was an “exceptional” one, finding a second basis to award attorney’s
fees and costs.209 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs exemplified
“paradigmatic examples of litigants in the business of bringing
oppressive litigation designed to extract settlement.”210
Although the district court Central Manufacturing seemed to
suggest that the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees and costs were
different under the Lanham Act and under the ICA (“exceptional”
versus “oppressive”), two trademark decisions by the Seventh Circuit
clarify that the court considers this standard to be the same. First, in
Door Systems v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc.,211 the Seventh Circuit
held that the “canonical formula” for determining whether to award
attorney’s fees to the defendant in a Lanham Act case in the Seventh
Circuit is “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.”212 In Te-Ta-Ma
Truth Foundation-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator,
the Seventh Circuit confirmed its holding in Door Systems, stating “we
concluded that [in a Lanham Act case] the appropriate inquiry when
the defendant is the prevailing party is whether the plaintiff’s suit is
oppressive….[w]e have clarified that a suit may be oppressive “if it
lacked merit, had elements of an abuse of process claim, and [the]
plaintiff's conduct unreasonably increased the cost of defending
against the suit.”213
In this case, however, this was a distinction without a difference. It
was obvious that the plaintiff’s actions constituted vexatious and
207

Id.
Id. at *13-14.
209
Id. at *14.
210
Id.
211
126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997).
212
Id.
213
392 F.3d 248 257-58 (7th Cir. 2004).
208
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wasteful litigation warranting reprisal and the award of attorneys’ fees
and costs. The question of whether the failure to provide evidence of
commercial use after bringing a trademark infringement suit will
always rise to the level of egregiousness in order to qualify for an
award of attorney’s fees and costs is a fact intensive question assessed
on a case-by-case basis.214
However, the statutory mandate is explicitly apparent: if one does
not use a mark in commerce one does not have ownership rights to
that mark. Accordingly, where it is clear at the outset of filing suit that
the plaintiff’s theory of ownership is meritless or lacking in
evidentiary support, the plaintiff’s conduct should be considered
sufficiently culpable to meet the Seventh Circuit’s “oppressive”
standard and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded.
CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that the commercial use of a trademark and not its
registration confers enforceable rights in that mark. As basic as it may
seem to those well-versed in the field of trademark law, it is apparent
that some still misunderstand the U.S.’s use-based system of
registration. In Central Manufacturing, the plaintiff was certainly
confused. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit got it right.
The district courts should not wait for a defendant to plead
cancellation as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement
where it is clear that the plaintiff’s registration is invalid. Rather,
district courts should adopt the “cancellation-as-best-course” approach
enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Central Manufacturing, and
invoke the power to cancel sua sponte when given the opportunity by
a plaintiff filing suit without valid rights to the registered mark in
question. A more liberal invocation of the courts’ power to cancel
promotes each of the three policy components that form the very
foundation of trademark law: protecting producers, protecting
consumers from confusion, and fostering fair competition. In addition,
214

Id. at 258 (“No one factor is determinative . . . we have concluded that a
case may be exceptional if a losing plaintiff's litigation conduct is particularly
egregious”).
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the cancellation-as-best-course route provides greater certainty
regarding the status of trademark rights by putting the public on notice
of the district court’s trademark related judgments and refreshing the
federal register. It will also reduce the production of trademark
thickets thereby releasing marks into the public domain for other
producers to make meaningful use.
Further, a combination of the threat of cancellation and the award
of attorney’s fees creates a powerful situation which may deter
trademark trolls from either filing, or threatening to file, meritless
trademark infringement suits. Although Stoller was the extreme case
due to the nature of his extensive litigation history, Central
Manufacturing stands for the proposition that if a party chooses to
bring a trademark infringement suit, they better be sure to have
credible evidence establishing commercial use. Otherwise, they may
not only risk losing their registration, but may be forced to pay the
costs of litigation.
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